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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
TYRRELL WILLIAMS, whose annotations to the Restatement of
the Law of Contracts of the American Law Institute are con-
tinued in this issue, is a Professor in the School of Law. This
work is being done under the auspices of the American Law
Institute and the Missouri Bar Association.
Notes
STATE CONTROL OVER CONTRACT MOTOR CARRIERS
The overlapping of transportation facilities in the United
States has long been one of the classic illustrations of the waste
incident to the operation of individualistic competitive industry.
Duplication of service has been the consequence of speculative
overdevelopment, with results harmful to the efficiency of the
service itself and disastrous to the interest of the investor in
transportation securities. Destructive competition between par-
allel railroads serving virtually the same territory, as well as be-
tween railroads and shippers by water routes, has long been de-
plored by those familiar with the carriage situation. In com-
paratively recent years, however, this condition has been further
disordered by the emergence of a new giant in the struggle, motor
transportation. Enjoying competitive advantages of elasticity
of operation and cheapness of cost, highway carriers have di-
verted a great volume of business from established railroad inter-
ests, until those interests have, with some justification, placed
upon this new competitor much of the responsibility for their own
financial collapse.
It is recognized that in the field of transportation the ultimate
goal of regulation is a working coordination of the several trans-
portation agencies." It is with the end in view of coordinating
motor transportation facilities into some comprehensive scheme
that state legislatures have for some time experimented with
plans of regulation of the motor carrier. With one phase of this
regulation this note concerns itself.
Obviously there was little difficulty, even at the outset, in
formulating a system of control for motor common carriers.
' Regulation of the Contract Motor Carrier under the Constitution, LaRue
Brown and Stuart N. Scott (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 530. "The
question of economics which is posed is how to work out the relationship of
these-and other---competing forms of transportation so as to provide the
maximum of public service at the least cost to shipper and consumer and with
fair compensation to the labor and capital employed."
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Concepts developed in the evolution of regulation of railroad com-
mon carriers were available in treatment of these motor carriers.
It may be considered an established principle that state regulation
of the highway common carrier, as of the common carrier by rail,
is constitutionally valid, 2 in so far as the question of state inter-
ference with interstate commerce is not concerned. 3
The admitted power of a state to regulate intrastate motor com-
mon carriers disposed largely of the problem of equalizing com-
petition between passenger carriers by rail and passenger car-
riers by motor. Passenger service lends itself, generally, only to
a development of common carriage, and the private contract car-
rier of passengers is insignificant. In the trucking field, how-
ever, motor transportation is better suited to the conduct of busi-
ness under special individual contracts than the conduct of busi-
ness by common carriers with stated schedules and fixed routes.
Private contract motor carriers have made greater inroads in the
business of established transportation agencies than have the
common or public carriers, and any attempt to impose regulation
on the latter is ineffectual unless the private carrier also is sub-
mitted to reasonable regulation.
This article contemplates a consideration of state legislation
of the intrastate contract motor carrier. The related problem as
to what restrictions may be placed by the state upon the interstate
carrier must be reserved since their consideration would involve
too lengthy a discussion of the complex problems of constitutional
law involved in our federal system of government. At the outset
the contract motor carrier is to be distinguished: first, from the
common motor carrier; and second, from the private carrier of
property, that is the shipper who uses his own trucks in trans-
porting property sold by him in carrying out his business enter-
prises. Differentiation is not the least of the difficulties. The
avowedly common carrier cannot be distinguished precisely from
an ostensible private carrier operating under several individual
contracts. About all that can be said is that a private contract
carrier is one conducting motor transportation for hire, and not
a common carrier. Use must be made of the classic test of com-
mon carriage-whether the carrier voluntarily assumes the duty
to serve all those desiring to use his facilities. 4
2 As to "business affected with a public interest" cf. Munn v. Illinois
(1876) 94 U. S. 113 (warehousing); Peik v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1876) 94
U. S. 164 (railway common carriers); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub-
lic Service Corporation (1919) 248 U. S. 372 (electricity).
3 Buck v. Kuykendall (1925) 267 U. S. 307; Bush & Sons v. Maloy (1925)
267 U. S. 317.
Universally applied is an objective test much more easily announced than
scientifically determined in a particular case: whether or not the carrier in
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In considering the judicial treatment which has been accorded
these state experiments in control of the motor contract carrier in
the cases which have delimited the power of a state's authority to
regulate, the viewpoint of the writer is perhaps warped by an
assumption that the cases should be considered in the light of
the ultimate economic purpose which the various statutes have
had in mind-the aforementioned coordination of the motor car-
rier into the comprehensive transportation set-up. From this
point of view, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Su-
preme Court of the United States has followed an inconsistent
course in passing upon the several state statutes dealing with the
subject, due largely to an over-occupation with one established
principle. Its attitude has been one of apparent suspicion; in
its eagerness to detect a possible violation of that established con-
cept it has lost sight both of the dangerous implications of over-
turning the state plans for regulation and of the clear meaning of
the statutes.
The unassailable principle that a state may not by legislative
fiat make a private carrier into a common carrier 5 was applied to
the field of motor transportation in the now leading case of Michi-
gan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke.6 The transportation
law of MichiganZ imposed on all persons carrying on motor trans-
portation for hire over the state highways the burdens and duties
of common carriers.8 Regulations traditionally incident to com-
mon carriage were imposed: a permit to be issued in accordance
with public convenience and necessity; and indemnity bonds to
secure payment of claims resulting from damage to cargo. The
chief basis of the decision was the theory that it violated the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution by imposing un-
reasonable conditions upon the right to carry on interstate com-
fact holds himself out to serve the public. "The criterion is, whether he
carries for particular persons only or whether he carries for everyone. If a
man holds himself out to do it for everyone who asks him, he is a common
carrier; but if he does not do it for everyone, but carries for you and me
only, that is a matter of special contract." Ingate v. Christie (1850) 3 Car.
& K. 61, 175 Eng. Repr. 463.
5 Cf. Produce Transportation Company v. Railroad Commission of Cali-
fornia (1920) 251 U. S. 228, to the effect that the state legislature cannot
convert a private carrier pipe line into a common carrier by legislative fiat.
6 (1925) 266 U. S. 570.
Act No. 209, Public Acts of Michigan (1923).
8 "Any and all persons engaged . . . in the transportation of persons or
property for hire by motor vehicle, upon or over the public highways of this
state . . . shall be common carriers, and, so far as applicable, all laws of
this state now in force or hereafter enacted, regulating . . . transportation
. . . by other common carriers, including regulation of rates, shall apply
with equal force and effect to such common carriers . . . by motor vehicles."
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merce,9 but the case is chiefly important in this investigation for
its further holding that to convert property used exclusively in
private carriage into a public utility, or to make the owner a pub-
lic carrier by legislative flat is beyond the power of a state; since
it would be taking property for public use without just compensa-
tion in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Frost and Frost Trucking Company v. Railroad Commission of
California1 0 restated the principle of the Duke case with one
notable advance, the view that a statute in effect requires a con-
tract carrier to become a common carrier by the imposition upon
him of duties ordinarily incident to common carriage, although
there is no express statement of such an intention. The assailed
California statute"' required contract carriers operating over
the state highways over a fixed route or between fixed termini to
secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the
Railroad Commission, and submitted such carriers to supervision
by the Commission as to rates and public relations. The Su-
preme Court of California1 2 had held that the statute placed
private carriers falling within its terms under the same control
by the Railroad Commission as common carriers. Accepting the
state court's interpretation of the statute as binding, a majority
of the court held that, even though in form the statute purported
to be a mere denial of the right to use the highways without sub-
mitting to certain conditions,1 3 it in effect attempted to convert a
private carrier into a common carrier by edict of the legislature
and was unconstitutional. The Duke decision was cited as con-
trolling. Left undecided by the decision was the question (which
9 The interstate commerce phase of the decision was called forth by the
fact that the appellant carrier in the instant case was engaged in carriage
between Detroit, Michigan, and Toledo, Ohio, pursuant to three contracts for
shipment of motor bodies. The court said: "It is a burden upon interstate
commerce to impose upon the plaintiff the onerous duties and strict liability
of a common carrier .... These requirements have no relation to public
safety or order in the use of motor vehicles upon the highways or to the col-
lection of compensation for the use of the highways. The police power does
not extend so far."
10 (1926) 271 U. S. 583.
1, Auto, Stage, and Truck Transportation Act of California, c. 213;
Statutes of California (1917) p. 330.
12 Frost v. Railroad Commission (1925) 197 Cal. 230, 240 Pac. 26.
Is In this regard note the language in Packard v. Banton (1924) 264 U. S.
140: ". . . a distinction must be observed between the regulation of an ac-
tivity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried on by
government sufferance or permission. In the latter case the power to ex-
clude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condition and may
justify a degree of regulation not admissible in the former."
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the minority contended was the sole oie presented) whether a
State may exact of a private carrier a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity as a condition precedent to the use of its
highways.
If it be conceded that the Supreme Court was bound to accept
the state court's interpretation of the statute in the Frost case,
that decision represents no great advance over the principle
enunciated in the Duke decision. A much more doubtful decision
is that in the case of Smith v. Cchoon,14 passing on the constitu-
tionality of a statute of the state of Florida. 15 This statute pro-
vided that all "auto transportation companies" should be re-
strained from carrying passengers or property for hire without
first obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from the Railroad Commission, and that their rates and service
should be subject to the regulation of that body. Appellant, a
private carrier under an exclusive contract with one firm, was
convicted for operating without securing the certificate and pay-
ing the tax provided for by the statute and appealed from the
state court's order affirming the validity of the statute.10 The
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional on the ground
that it subjected all carriers, private or common, to the same obli-
gations, holding that the uncertainty of the statute as to whether
the standards imposed were directed at the private carriers made
it impossible to sever from the rest of the statute those provisions
which might validly be applied to the appellant.17 It seems evi-
dent that the court here is unduly influenced by the Frost and
Duke decisions. Neither the statute here nor the state court ex-
pressly mentions either common carriage or its distinguishing
characteristic, the duty to serve all desiring the facilities. The
court's position seems to be that to impose upon a private carrier
characteristic common carrier regulations, as to rates and serv-
ices, without imposing a duty to serve is nevertheless equivalent
to actual conversion into a common carrier. The court has not
the justification here which it had in the Duke and Frost decisions,
in one of which by statute and in the other by interpretation of
the state court, there was an express conversion of the private
carrier into a common carrier. In extracting the duty to serve
from the concept of common carriage, the court overlooks the fact
"4 (1931) 283 U. S. 553.
15 Chapter 13,700, Acts 1929, Florida General Laws (Supp. 1930), section
1335.
16 Cahoon v. Smith (1930) 99 Fla. 1174, 120 So. 362.
27 "No separate scheme of regulation can be discerned in the terms of the
act with respect to those considerations of safety and proper operation af-
fecting the use of the highways which may appropriately relate to private
carriers as well as to common carriers."
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that fundamentally it was the imposition of that duty which, in
the beginning, rendered unconstitutional the conversion of pri-
vate carriers into common carriers.
It was while the case law on this subject was in the condition
indicated 18 that an article appeared in the Harvard Law Re-
view19 reviewing the course of the decisions and setting out the
prophecy, justifiable in the light of the prior decisions, that:
. . . regulation in the sense of control of contracts, rates
and practices, and of the right to engage in the business,
cannot be imposed upon the contract motor carrier without
violating the due process clause. .... If, for constitutional
reasons, this illusory expedient must be abandoned with
respect to the contract carrier, it is reasonable to hope that
the intelligence of the business world will, by using the
facilities at hand, work out a complete mechanism in which
the railroad, the steamship, the pipe line, the airplane, and
the motor vehicle will each be assigned the part in which it
can contribute most to the cheap and efficient transportation
upon which the public welfare depends. 20
That the prophecy has not come to fulfillment is due not to any
lack of perspicacity of the authors of the above article, but to what
can be described only as a change in emphasis by the Supreme
Court of the United States in its more recent consideration of
state regulatory statutes. That emphasis is upon the state's
power arising from control of the highways to adopt legislation
in the interest of the preservation of the highways and of the
safety of the traveling public.
Continental Baking Company v. Woodring21 approving a
18 At the time of the publication of the article, Smith v. Cahoon was await-
ing review by the Supreme Court, on appeal from the Supreme Court of
Florida. Had the decision been rendered at the time, it would have con-
firmed the conclusions of the authors, in no small degree.
" Regulation of the Contract Motor Carrier under the Constitution by
LaRue Brown and Stuart N. Scott (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 530.
20 In explaining their conclusions Messrs. Brown and Scott asserted that
state regulation of rates, practices, or competition in this field could not be
justified on either of the accepted bases of state regulation of the contract
carrier: i. e. first: power arising from control of the highways, to enforce
regulations to preserve the highways and guard the safety of the traveling
public; and, second: power of control arising from the nature of the busi-
ness. The first theory, it was contended, could not justify such regulations
because they are not bona fide highway regulations. The second was con-
sidered inapplicable because in the intendment of the decisions, the sole in-
ference from the clothing of common carriers with a "public interest" is
that other types of carriers possess no such characteristic.
21 (1931) 286 U. S. 352.
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statute of the State of Kansas is in itself no great advance but is
significant as a forerunner of the decisions to come. The Kansas
statute referred to classified motor carriers into three groups 22
and provided that contract carriers and private motor carriers
must obtain licenses, keep a travel record for purposes of taxation
per ton-mile, and furnish liability insurance. 23 An indication of
the changed emphasis is in the following passage: "Requirements
of this sort are clearly within the authority of the state, which
may demand compensation for the special facilities it has pro-
vided and regulate the use of its highways to promote the public
safety."
Along the same general tendency is the case of Sproles 'v. Bin-
ford,24 in which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of those
provisions of the motor vehicle act of Texas prescribing limita-
tions on the size, weight, and load of motor vehicles operating over
the highways of the State. The court stressed the right of the
state to prevent the wear and hazards incident to traffic of ve-
hicles of excessive size and weight of load.
Motor carrier regulation history was made by the Supreme
Court last December in Stephenson v. Binford25 by the Court's ap-
proval of a statute of the state of Texas 26 which provides about
as comprehensive a plan for coordinating the contract carrier
into the transportation mosaic as any advocate of public regula-
tion might have asked. The statute has several significant pro-
22 Laws of 1931, c. 236. Passed primarily for exacting taxation as com-
pensation for use of the highways, the act classified motor carriers into the
three accepted groups: 0
(1) "Public motor carrier", defined as one transporting "for hire as a
common carrier," having fixed termini or fixed route.
(2) "Contract motor carrier", defined as one who is not a "public motor
carrier" and is engaged in transportation for hire as a business.
(3) "Private motor carrier of property", defined as one transporting
"property sold or to be sold by him in furtherance of any private
commercial enterprise."
23 In relation to the state's power to impose a bond and insurance require-
ment a distinction must be made between such as are intended to secure pay-
ment of claims arising from injuries to the public as a result of motor opera-
tion and on the other hand such requirements as are intended to secure pay-
ment of those claims and liabilities arising out of injuries to the cargo car-
ried. The former type of insurance requirement is valid as a provision for
the public safety; the other is invalid, as an attempt to condition the private
cntractual relationship between shipper and private carrier.
24 (1931) 286 U. S. 374. The earlier cases on this subject are treated in
an article by John J. George, State Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers
(1929) 14 St. Louis L. Rev. 136, 1. c. 154.
25 (1932) 287 U. S. 251.
28 Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, article 911b, sections 1
et seq.
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visions: first: it requires a contract carrier to obtain a permit
from the Railroad Commission as a condition precedent to opera-
tion, and makes the issuance of the permit dependent on the con-
dition that the efficiency of existing common carrier service is
not impaired; second: it authorizes the Railroad Commission to
prescribe minimum rates, not less than those prescribed for com-
mon carriers for substantially the same service; third: it re-
quires every motor carrier to furnish a policy of insurance. 27
Naturally the unprecedented scope of the control spurred the in-
terested appellant to indignant protests that it was another at-
tempt to convert the private carriers of Texas into common car-
riers, depriving the appellant of his property without due process
of law and abrogating his rights of private contract. In view of
the past holdings of the Supreme Court it would seem that the
appellant had just legal cause for complaint.
The saving grace of the entire statute, however, seems to lie
in Section 22 (b) which is a broad recital of policy that the re-
strictions are to the end that the various transportation agencies
of the state be "adjusted and correlated" so that the public high-
ways may be preserved to serve the best interests of the general
public.
The court, excluding other considerations, viewed as the issue
of the case: Whether in the light of the broad general rule just
stated 28 the statute may be construed and sustained as a con-
stitutional exercise of the legislative power to regulate the use
of the state highway? The court in answering its query with an
affirmative, based its sanction of the statute on the theory that
"the assailed provisions of the statute are not ends in and of
themselves but means to the legitimate end of conserving the
highways." The extent to which, as means, they lead to the re-
quired end, was, in the opinion of the court, a question left to the
reasonable judgment of the legislature. In other words by im-
posing regulations to equalize contract carrier competition with
existing common carrier traffic by rail or truck, and by making
the non-existence of adequate transportation facilities a condi-
tion precedent to the issue of a permit, the state will decrease the
27 As against appellants' construction of the bond and insurance policy re-
quirement that it included insurance of cargo which might not validly be re-
quired, the court refused to pass on the question, holding that because no
attempt had been made to enforce the provision against the appellants, they
had no cause to complain until such attempt was made.
"s "It is well established law that the highways of the state are public
property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and
that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, gen-
erally, at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit." Cit-
ing Packard v. Banton, supra; Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati
(1932) 284 U. S. 335; and others.
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number of contract carriers and mitigate the pressure of the
traffic on the highways of Texas.
Welcome as this decision is to the writer, meaning as it does
that the states need no longer continue the trial and error method
in the hope of getting a statute by the Supreme Court, it cannot
be denied that this is a classic example of judicial rationalizing.
It would better become the court frankly to assert the proposition
that changing conditions in the transportation field have necessi-
tated the abandonment of a concept of law which led only to chaos
in the field. The fallacy of the court's theory is its ignoring the
fact that most of the carriage which would have been done by the
unregulated contract carrier will be done under an equalizing of
competition, not by non-highway carriers but either by common
carriers by motor vehicle or by private trucks which the shippers
will purchase for their own use, both of which equally will wear
the highway. This indicates an insularity of mind which ill be-
comes the supreme tribunal.
Aside from its "far fetched" reasoning, however, the Binford
decision is auspicious and with ample economic justification.
Coming as it does at a time when existing transportation facilities
are greatly in excess of any effective demand possible in the im-
mediate future, it gives the states something of a free hand in co-
ordinating their transportation assets-to work the contract car-
rier into the comprehensive system of transportation in a man-
ner which will provide for adequate public service, and yet will
prevent tottering railroad valuations from further disaster.
Future state legislation will, in all probability, adopt the oppor-
tunity of incorporating into itself such a recital as that which
gave the court its cue for a change of heart in Stephenson v. Bin-ford. "Oh highway preservation! What regulations shall be
committed in thy name." HARRY W. JONES, '34.
THE SUABILITY OF AN UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATION IN MISSOURI
It appears to be a well settled rule of the common law that an
unincorporated association cannot maintain an action in its own
name,' but must sue or be sued in the names of the component
members,2 in the absence of a statute granting such powers.3
1 Francis v. Perry (1913) 144 N. Y. S. 167; Detroit Schuetzen Bund v.
Detroit Agitation Verein (1880) 44 Mich. 313, 6 N. W. 675.2 Lewelling v. Woodworkers Underwriters (1919) 140 Ark. 124, 128, 215
S. W. 258, 259; Westbrook v. Griffin (1906) 132 Iowa 185, 109 N. W. 608;
McMahon v. Rauhr (1871) 47 N. Y. 67.
3 Int'l Bro. Loc. Engineers v. Green (1921) 206 Ala. 196, 89 So. 435;
Washington University Open Scholarship
